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Industrial Relations Climate and Union Commitment:  
An Evaluation of Workplace-Level Effects 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the relationship between industrial relations (IR) climate and union 
commitment. Using a multi-workplace sample from North-East England, aggregation 
analysis provided support for treating IR climate as a workplace-level variable, and 
workplace IR climate was negatively associated with union commitment. However, IR 
climate moderated none of the relationships between individual-level antecedents and 
union commitment. 
 
Keywords: union commitment; industrial relations climate. 
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Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard‟s (1999) meta-analysis identified union 
instrumentality, pro-union attitudes, organizational commitment and job satisfaction as 
antecedents of an individual‟s commitment to their union. However, in concluding the 
paper, they suggested that:  “...researchers should begin to focus their attention on how 
multivariate union commitment models may vary with the nature and composition of the 
workforce examined as well as with environmental characteristics, such as the industrial 
relations context” (Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard 1999: 315; our emphasis). In this 
paper, we consider workplace “industrial relations (IR) climate” as one such environmental 
characteristic with the potential to influence employees‟ commitment to their union.   
A workplace may be seen as having a particular IR climate, defined as the degree to 
which relations between management and employees are seen by participants as mutually 
trusting, respectful and co-operative (Hammer, Currall, and Stern 1991), or in terms of 
workplace norms and attitudes concerning industrial relations and union-management 
relations (Dastmalchian, Blyton, and Adamson 1989; Dastmalchian 2008). Dastmalchian, 
Blyton, and Adamson (1991) see workplace IR climate as an outcome of the organizational 
context and structure, human resource policies and wider industrial relations context, with 
climate mediating the relationship between these and industrial relations outcomes.  
Studies that have considered IR climate as an antecedent of individual employee 
attitudes and behavior have generally conceptualized and measured IR climate at the level 
of the individual employee (e.g., Deery, Iverson, and Erwin 1994; Deery, Erwin, and 
Iverson 1999). This involves examining differences in individual perceptions of climate. 
However, IR climate may be more appropriately conceptualized as a characteristic of the 
workplace (Dastmalchian 2008), even when it is used to try to predict individual attitudes and 
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behavior. This is common in the literature on other types of organizational climates, where 
individual ratings of climate provided by members of a workplace or unit are aggregated to 
provide a unit-level climate rating, and this is then used to predict hypothesized outcomes 
at the level of the individual (e.g., Schneider, White and Paul 1998; Liao and Chuang 2004; 
Hofmann, Morgeson and Gerras 2003; Gavin and Hofmann 2002). This approach requires 
that climate be conceptualized as a characteristic of the workplace, and if individual 
climate ratings are to be aggregated to the workplace level then there must be evidence of 
some consensus within workplaces, along with inter-workplace variance in climate (James, 
Demaree and Wolf 1993; Bliese and Halverson 1998). Furthermore, when analyzing the 
antecedents of individual attitudes the fact that employees are nested within workplaces 
requires the use of an appropriate analytical approach, such as hierarchical liner modeling 
(Hofmann 1997). 
In this paper, we make two main contributions. First, we evaluate whether it is 
appropriate to consider IR climate as a workplace-level construct, by examining the 
appropriate aggregation statistics. In so doing, we aim to answer the question: To what 
extent is it appropriate to treat IR climate as a characteristic of the workplace rather than 
simply as an individual perceptual variable?  Second, we consider the role of IR climate in 
analyzing the antecedents of union commitment. We analyze IR climate at both the 
individual (“psychological”) and workplace levels, evaluating their relative contribution 
towards explaining variance in individual union commitment. This enables us to determine 
at which level of analysis IR climate exerts its main influence on union commitment. There 
have been calls for work climate researchers to make greater use of multi-level models in 
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the analysis of the consequences of climate (Kuenzi and Schminke 2009), and we extend 
this approach to the analysis of IR climate.  
Theory and hypotheses 
Antecedents of union commitment 
Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard (1999) identified the individual-level antecedents 
of union commitment commonly analyzed in previous studies. Their meta-analysis 
suggested that both perceived union instrumentality, defined as members‟ perceived 
impact of the union on valued outcomes such as wages and employment conditions 
(Fullagar and Barling 1989), and pro-union attitudes, defined as the perceived desirability 
of unions in general (McShane 1986), were positively associated with union commitment. 
Organizational commitment was also positively associated with union commitment, whilst 
job satisfaction had a negative association with union commitment. However, in the wider 
literature, there have been mixed findings on the organizational commitment- and job 
satisfaction-union commitment relationships (Reed, Young, and McHugh 1994; Fuller and 
Hester 1998), and Tan and Aryee‟s (2002) Singaporean study found no significant direct 
effect of job satisfaction on union commitment. In light of such mixed findings, we 
consider moderation effects (see below). 
Aside from the uncertainty about organizational commitment and job satisfaction, 
we anticipate replicating Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard‟s (1999) findings on the 
antecedents of union commitment. Since this stage of our analysis is designed simply to 
provide a baseline against which to assess the significance of IR climate, we do not specify 
formal hypotheses.  
Industrial relations climate 
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Workplaces may be characterized as having a particular “climate”, defined in terms 
of the “norms, attitudes, feelings and behaviors prevalent at the workplace” (Dastmalchian 
2008: 549). Recognising that organizational climate is multi-faceted, climate researchers 
have focussed their conceptualizations (Blyton, Dastmalchian, and Adamson 1987), so that 
we have studies of, for example, “service climate” (e.g., Schneider, White, and Paul 1998; 
Liao and Chuang 2004), “safety climate” (e.g., Hofmann, Morgeson, and Gerras 2003), 
“procedural justice climate” (Naumann and Bennet 2000), “leadership climate” (Gavin 
and Hofmann 2002), and “industrial relations climate” (e.g., Hammer, Currall, and Stern 
1991; Datsmalchian 2008). The notion is that if climate is to be linked with outcomes there 
must be a correspondence between climate and outcomes (Dastmalchian 2008: 552).  
A workplace has an “industrial relations (IR) climate” to the extent that the 
organizational and industrial relations context “generates a distinctive atmosphere in the 
organization … as perceived by the organizational members” (Dastmalchian, Blyton, and 
Adamson 1989: 23). More specifically, IR climate has been defined in terms of workplace 
norms and attitudes concerning industrial relations  (Blyton, Dastmalchian, and Adamson 
1987; Dastmalchian, Blyton, and Adamson 1989; Dastmalchian 2008), and as the degree to 
which the labor-management relations are cooperative or conflictual, reflected in the extent 
to which relations between management and employees are seen by participants as 
mutually trusting, respectful and co-operative (Hammer, Currall, and Stern 1991).  
In considering climate, we are discussing a contextual factor: the perceived state of 
employee-management relationships in a particular workplace. There have been studies of 
IR climate entirely at the organizational or workplace level of analysis. In some studies this 
has involved single-respondent (managers or union officials) assessments of organizational 
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IR climate and organizational performance, typically finding positive associations between 
climate and performance (Wagar 1997a; 1997b; 2002). Others have used employee 
assessments aggregated to the workplace level, suggesting positive associations between 
workplace-level  IR climate on the one hand, and workplace-level organizational 
commitment and union loyalty on the other (Deery and Iverson 2005).  
However, to the extent that previous studies have considered IR climate as an 
antecedent of individual employee attitudes and behavior, it has been measured and 
analyzed at the level of the individual employee (e.g., Deery, Iverson, and Erwin 1994; 
Deery, Erwin, and Iverson 1999). Such an approach, especially with a sample drawn from a 
single workplace or organization, essentially examines differences in individual perceptions, 
so-called “psychological climate” rather than “organizational climate” (Dastmalchian 2008; 
Kuenzi and Schminke 2009). However, our concern is with workplace context, so that IR 
climate may be more appropriately conceptualized at the workplace level. The argument is 
that climate is a characteristic of a particular workplace, reflecting the history, management 
style and industrial relations context, reflecting more than simply the individual 
psychology of climate survey respondents. According to this view, climate reflects to some 
degree the shared experience and perceptions of members of the workplace.  
This still leaves us with the problem of how to assess climate. A common approach 
in the climate literatures generally is to aggregate individual ratings of climate provided by 
members of a particular unit or workplace (e.g., Schneider, White, and Paul 1998; Liao and 
Chuang 2004; Hofmann, Morgeson, and Gerras 2003; Gavin and Hofmann 2002). This 
approach draws on a direct consensus model, seeing climate as a property of the group 
(workplace), formed by aggregating group-member ratings, and requiring a degree of 
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group consensus to justify aggregation (Chan 1998; Schneider, Salvaggio, and Subirats 
2002; Kuenzi and Schminke 2009). This aggregated assessment reflects the extent to 
which, on average, climate is seen as positive in a particular workplace. This is the 
approach taken in this paper. We collect individual employee ratings of IR climate in a 
sample of workplaces, and we assess the statistical evidence favoring the aggregation of 
individual scores to the workplace level. This implies, as Kuenzi and Schminke point out 
regarding organizational climates in general, that “…the origins of organizational climate 
lie in individual perceptions: however, it is a property of the unit” (2009: 638)  
The consequences of industrial relations climate 
There is reason to believe that IR climate may influence union commitment. One 
suggestion, from social exchange theory, is that there is a credit effect as members value a 
positive IR climate as part of a positive social exchange and credit both the union and the 
organization with responsibility for this, resulting in higher commitment to both (Magenau, 
Martin and Peterson, 1988; Deery and Iverson 2005). There may also be a cognitive 
consistency effect (Angle and Perry 1986; Magenau, Martin and Peterson, 1988). In a 
positive IR climate, union members are less likely to perceive a conflict between their roles 
as employees and as union members, making it easier for them to feel strong commitment 
to both union and organization simultaneously. In contrast, a negative IR climate results in 
perceived role conflict, with individuals feeling uncomfortable committing to both 
organization and union, so that they feel obliged to choose between commitment to either 
union or organization.  
Both the credit and cognitive consistency arguments suggests a positive association 
between IR climate and union commitment. However, there have been mixed findings on 
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the association between IR climate and union commitment. Several US studies have found 
a positive relationship (e.g., Angle and Perry 1986; Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988), 
but Deery, Iverson, and Erwin (1994), in a study of Australian public sector workers, 
found a negative association between IR climate and union commitment. This negative 
association may reflect a stronger felt need for union representation and protection in a 
negative, conflictual work context, with members responding by showing stronger 
commitment to the union. There is corroboration for such an effect in the suggestion that 
union commitment increases during industrial conflict (Stagner and Efflal 1982), and in 
Mellor‟s (1990) finding that union commitment is higher where the union is under threat 
from membership loss. Similarly, Mellor (1990: 259) reports findings from earlier studies 
suggesting that positive in-group evaluations and cohesion, support for union activity and 
attitudinal support for union militancy are all associated with union-management conflict. 
In contrast to the positive “credit/cognitive consistency effect”, such arguments suggest a 
“threat effect”, involving a negative association between IR climate and union commitment.   
So far, these arguments have been couched largely in terms of individual 
psychology. However, in suggesting a link between workplace IR climate and union 
commitment, we need to consider group-level dynamics. In their discussion of procedural 
justice climate, Naumann and Bennett (2000) argue that workplace procedures represent 
group values and that coworkers influence each others‟ perceptions of the workplace 
climate, along with their attitudinal and behavioral responses to that climate, so that 
“[t]hrough socialization, group members learn about incidents in which group values have 
been violated (such as a supervisor‟s having treated the group unfairly) and about how 
other members reacted to such incidents” (Naumann and Bennett 2000: 884). Such group 
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dynamics are also likely to operate with respect to workplace IR climate and union 
commitment, generalizing and amplifying the individual psychological effects discussed 
above, as individuals are socialized into a more or less shared understanding of the 
workplace IR climate and of the appropriate response. Such group processes will not 
necessarily privilege either positive or negative effects on union commitment, but what 
they will do is to imbue such effects with group (i.e., workplace) properties.  
Given the conflicting expectations, with potential “credit/cognitive consistency” 
and “threat” effects having opposite signs, we offer no directional hypothesis on the 
relationship between IR climate and union commitment. Instead, we evaluate the 
relationship as an open question. Unlike earlier studies, we examine the association  
between IR climate and union commitment at both the psychological and workplace 
climate levels. In particular, we test whether workplace IR climate explains variance in 
union commitment over and above that explained by individual-level psychological IR 
climate. Thus, we offer the following non-directional hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1. Workplace IR climate explains variance in individual union 
commitment over and above that explained by psychological IR climate. 
In addition to the direct effect, IR climate may moderate several of the antecedent 
relationships in predicting union commitment. For example, whilst most studies have 
shown a positive association between organizational commitment and union commitment 
(e.g., Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988), some show a negative association (Reed, 
Young, and McHugh 1994; Fuller and Hester 1998), and IR climate has been identified as 
a possible moderator of this relationship. Again, a cognitive consistency argument applies: 
Where IR climate is positive, individuals may feel comfortable committing to both 
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organization and union, whereas an adversarial climate may mean that individuals feel that 
the two commitments are inconsistent, so that they must choose to “side” with either 
employer or union (Fuller and Hester 1998; Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988). 
Similarly, in their meta-analysis, Fuller and Hester (1998) found that IR climate moderated 
the relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment, with a positive 
relationship in a cooperative climate and a negative relationship in an adversarial climate. 
In addition, they found a weaker positive relationship between union instrumentality and 
union commitment in less adversarial IR climates, arguing that this “… is most likely due 
to the fact that basic economic needs are being satisfied” (Fuller and Hester 1998: 183), so 
that presumably union instrumentality will be less salient than in a highly adversarial 
climate. Finally, they found that the positive relationship between pro-union attitudes and 
commitment was stronger in more adversarial climates, where the ideological and 
socialization messages transmitted by pro-union co-workers and representatives are likely 
to be more urgent (Fuller and Hester 1998).  
Based on these arguments and on Fuller and Hester‟s (1998) meta-analytic findings, 
we offer the following hypotheses, specified at the workplace level: 
Hypothesis 2. Workplace IR climate moderates the relationship between a) 
organizational commitment and b). job satisfaction on the one hand, and union 
commitment on the other, such that these relationships are more strongly positive where IR 
climate is positive. 
Hypothesis 3. Workplace IR climate moderates the relationship between a).  
instrumentality and b). pro-union attitudes on the one hand, and union commitment on the 
other, such that these relationships are more strongly positive where IR climate is negative. 
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Method 
Sample 
 The sample was identified through the Arbitration, Conciliation and Advisory 
Service (ACAS), a publicly-funded but independent organization with a mission to 
improve employment relations. We used the ACAS North East officers‟ contacts list to 
approach HR officers or senior managers to request participation in the study, and 114 
workplaces initially agreed to participate. Each workplace was sent a pack consisting of a 
questionnaire to be completed by the on-site manager responsible for HRM, a 
questionnaire for the senior general manager on site, and fifty questionnaires to be 
distributed to a sample of employees. In addition, if the workplace recognized trade unions 
(identified from the initial telephone call), questionnaires for up to 5 union representatives 
were included. Questionnaires had a workplace identifier and were returned direct to the 
University. We received at least partial responses from 60 workplaces, a 53 percent 
response rate. We received 867 responses from employees in these workplaces.  
 In this paper, we use only the employee responses, and we restrict our analysis to non-
managerial, unionized employees. We excluded those workplaces which had fewer than 3 
individual respondents in our sample. This reduced the sample for analysis to 31 
workplaces and 334 employees. Although not a strictly representative sample, the 
respondents cover the main sectors of employment in North East England (Office for 
National Statistics, 2008) with an emphasis on manufacturing (e.g. light engineering, 
processed food, brewing, pharmaceuticals, chemicals) and the public sector (healthcare, 
local government, universities, civil service, and uniformed services - police, fire and 
ambulance). Small firms are less likely to use ACAS service and we deleted those with 
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fewer than 3 union members, so that small firms are underrepresented in our final sample. 
Also, given their lower unionization rates, private services (e.g., TV, hotels, transport, and 
privatized utilities) were underrepresented. 
 Amongst this employee sample, average age was 40.84 and organizational tenure 
13.13 years. Forty-two percent were female, 75 percent were married, 14 percent worked 
part time and two percent were on a temporary contract. Twenty-five percent were in 
professional jobs, 29 percent worked as operators or in assembly jobs, 14 percent were 
clerical or secretarial, 12 percent were in craft or skilled jobs, 9 percent in personal or 
protective service jobs, 5 percent were technicians, and the rest were in other job categories. 
The workplaces ranged from 77 to 1,500 employees, with 45 percent in manufacturing, 13 
percent private-sector services, and 42 percent in the public sector. Union member 
responses per workplace ranged from 3 to 37.
1
    
Measurement 
In this paper, all measures were taken from the employee questionnaire. Unless 
otherwise mentioned, responses were on a seven-point scale from “Strongly disagree” (=1) 
to “Strongly agree” (=7). For job satisfaction we used the three-item measure of overall 
satisfaction from the Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire (Spector 1997). 
Organizational commitment involved four items based on Meyer and Allen‟s (1997) 
affective dimension, with all items positively worded, for example: “I really feel as if this 
organization‟s problems are my own”. These four items were chosen from the revised six-
item affective organizational commitment scale (Meyer and Allen 1987: 118). We 
excluded two items (“I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in this 
organization” and “I do not feel like „part of the family‟ at my organization”), because we 
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wanted to have parallel measures for affective commitment to organization and union (see 
below), and we felt that these two items lack face validity in a union context. Union 
instrumentality was based on Sverke and Kuruvilla‟s (1995) measure of “instrumental 
rationality-based commitment”, reflecting the satisfaction of salient personal goals. This 
included seven items, formed by taking the square root of the product of an item such as 
“The union‟s chances of improving my pay are great” and a corresponding item such as 
“To get higher pay is…”. (The latter was answered on a 7 point scale anchored from 1 
(very unimportant to me) to 7 (very important to me). We used the full scale, except we 
replaced one pair of items, referring to the union‟s chances of bringing a general 
improvement in “my work situation”, which we felt was rather vague, with a more specific 
item referring to the provision of membership benefits by the union. General pro-union 
attitudes refers to attitudes towards unions in general, and was measured with six items 
based on McShane (1986), for example: “Unions are a positive force in this country”. We 
dropped two items from the original eight-item scale, one because it appeared to reflect an 
assumption of compulsory union membership (“If I had to choose I would probably not be 
a member of a labor union”) and the other because it appeared largely to duplicate one of 
the other items (“Most people are better off without labor unions”).   
Union commitment was measured with four items based on Meyer and Allen‟s 
(1987) affective commitment scale. These paralleled those used to measure organizational 
commitment, but were adjusted to include the union as the focus. We adjusted the Meyer 
and Allen scale rather than used the Gordon et al (1980) union commitment scale. Having 
examined the Gordon et al scale, many of the items appeared to us to be meaningful only 
in a US context, and we feared that some of the language would be unintelligible to a UK 
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sample. Instead, we adjusted the focus of Meyer and Allen‟s well-established affective 
commitment construct to “the union”. Such an approach has been widely used in the 
multiple commitments and related literatures, to develop scales measuring commitment to 
occupation, to the supervisor and workgroup, to organizational change, and to the union 
(Meyer, Allen, and Smith 1993; Clugston, Howell, and Dorfman 2000; Herscovitch and 
Meyer 2002; Redman and Snape 2005). It is worth noting that the affective union 
commitment construct has been shown to correlate with the Skarlicki and Latham (1996) 
measure of union citizenship behavior (Snape and Redman, 2007). 
 We measured  IR climate using  Hammer, Currall, and Stern‟s (1991) six-item 
“labor relations climate” scale, which aims to assess whether labor-management relations 
in a particular workplace are cooperative or conflictual, reflected in the extent to which 
relations between management and employees are seen by participants as mutually trusting, 
respectful and co-operative (Hammer, Currall, and Stern 1991). It is important to 
emphasise that this scale asks about industrial relations in the workplace, rather than about 
the individual‟s own relationship with management or the organization. Deery, Iverson, 
and Erwin (1994) used this scale in their individual-level investigation of the effect of IR 
climate on union and organizational commitment. We used all six items from the original 
scale, and each employee rated the IR climate within their particular workplace. These 
individual-level ratings provided a measure of psychological IR climate. We also 
aggregated these individual ratings within each workplace to provide a measure of 
workplace IR climate (aggregation statistics are reported below). 
 We assessed an overall individual-level measurement model, including all six latent 
constructs, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, union instrumentality, pro-union 
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attitudes, union commitment, and IR climate. This provided a reasonable fit (
2
 = 795.947; 
df = 390; GFI = 0.863; CFI = 0.933; RMSEA = 0.056), and all indicators loaded 
significantly (p < 0.001) on their latent variables. A single-factor model provided a poor fit 
(
2
 = 4218.423; df = 405; GFI = 0.376; CFI = 0.371; RMSEA = 0.168), with a significant 
deterioration in chi-square (change in 
2
 = 3422.476; change in df = 15; p < 0.01), and 
marked differences in the other fit indices (e.g., change in CFI = .562). This provided 
support for the hypothesized measurement model.   
Results 
Individual-level means, standard deviations, correlations and alphas (all 
exceeding .8) are shown in table 1. Hypothesis 1 involved first assessing the 
appropriateness of aggregating individual employee scores on IR climate. We calculated 
within-group inter-rater reliabilities, rwg, for each workplace (James, Demaree and Wolf 
1984; 1993), along with intra-class correlation coefficients, ICC(1) and ICC(2) (Bliese and 
Halverson 1998). Median rwg was 0.81, indicating an acceptable level of within-group 
agreement. ICC(1) was 0.23, showing that a significant amount of variance resides at the 
workplace level. An ICC(2) of 0.75 suggested that workplaces can be differentiated in 
terms of employee ratings of IR climate. These findings compare favorably with values 
found in the literature (e.g., Schneider, White, and Paul 1998), and provide statistical 
support for treating IR climate as a workplace-level variable. 
We evaluated the effects of workplace IR climate using hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM), with union commitment as the dependent variable, and with job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, pro-union attitudes and union instrumentality as 
the individual-level independent variables. This provided a benchmark against which to 
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assess the role of IR relations climate, included first as a level-1 (individual) variable and 
then as a level-2 (workplace) variable. We adopted a staged approach, as shown in table 2, 
beginning with a null model, with no level-1 or level-2 predictors. This is essentially a one-
way analysis of variance, and the ratio of between-group to total variance provided an 
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.063, suggesting that 6.3 percent of the 
variance in union commitment may potentially be explained by level-2 predictors. 
Although the ICC was relatively small, there was significant between-group variance in 
union commitment, so that it was appropriate to examine level-2 predictors.   
Next, we estimated model 2, with level-1 predictors only. Union instrumentality (γ 
= .55, p<.001) and pro-union attitudes (γ = .50, p<.001) emerged as the main antecedents 
of union commitment, with no significant direct effect for job satisfaction (γ =  -.05, p>.10). 
Organizational commitment had a significant but small positive effect (γ = .12, p<.05). We 
added psychological IR climate in model 3, to control for this prior to adding workplace-
level climate. At this stage, psychological IR climate was significantly negatively 
associated with union commitment (γ = -.13, p<.05), suggesting that those who perceived 
climate more positively had lower union commitment.     
The existence of unexplained variance in level-1 intercepts or slopes is a 
precondition for testing group-level effects. Model 3 showed a significant random variance 
component for the intercept, so that in model 4, we included workplace IR climate as a 
level-2 predictor of union commitment. Workplace IR climate had a significant negative 
effect on union commitment (γ = -.31, p<.01). Once the level-2 workplace IR climate was 
included, level-1 psychological IR climate was not significant  (γ = -.07, p>.10), 
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demonstrating that IR climate had its effects at the workplace level, rather than as an 
individual perceptual variable, and providing support for hypothesis 1.   
The results for model 4 suggested significant random variance only for pro-union 
attitudes and instrumentality, and not for organizational commitment and job satisfaction. 
Therefore, in model 5, we added IR climate as a moderator for pro-union attitudes and 
union instrumentality only. However, there were no significant moderation effects, with 
both interactions non-significant (γ = -.06, p>.10; and γ = -.08, p>.10). Overall, there was 
no support for hypotheses 2 and 3. 
We were concerned that the association between workplace IR climate and union 
commitment might reflect sectoral differences, rather than an underlying relationship 
between IR climate and union commitment. We therefore repeated the HLM analysis with 
level-2 control variables for industry sector. This involved two dummy variables, 
representing public services and manufacturing, with others as the reference category. 
With workplace-level IR climate included, neither control variable was statistically 
significant (public services: γ = -.47, p>.10; and manufacturing: γ = -.11, p>.10), and the 
pattern of significant results was unchanged from that shown in table 2, with workplace IR 
climate significant (γ = -.20, p<.05) and psychological climate not (γ = -.07, p>.10).  
Collective bargaining level might also confound the association between workplace 
IR climate and union commitment. We therefore conducted a similar analysis for 
bargaining level, with two level-2 control variables representing organization-wide and 
industry/sector bargaining, with workplace-level bargaining as the reference category. 
With workplace-level IR climate also included, the industry/sector-wide bargaining 
variable was statistically significant (γ = -.35, p<.01), but that for organization-wide 
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bargaining was not (γ = .13, p>.10). However, the other conclusions were essentially 
unchanged, with workplace-level IR climate still statistically significant (γ = -.20, p<.05) 
and psychological climate not (γ = -.07, p>.10). These findings suggest that the association 
between workplace IR climate and union commitment was not a reflection of sector nor of 
the level at which collective bargaining was conducted.    
Finally, we repeated the analysis with individual-level control variables included. 
None of the control variables were statistically significant in the final equation (gender  [γ 
= -.07, p>.10], organizational tenure [γ = -.00, p>.10], part-time vs. full-time job status [γ = 
-.32, p>.10], temporary vs. permanent employment contract [γ = -.03, p>.10]), and there 
were no significant differences in the findings for other variables compared to table 2. In 
particular, workplace-level IR climate was still statistically significant (γ = -.28, p<.01) and 
psychological climate was not (γ = -.06, p>.10).   
Discussion 
We set out to addresses two key questions about industrial relations climate. First, 
to what extent is it appropriate to treat IR climate as a characteristic of the workplace rather 
than simply as a perceptual variable, varying primarily at the level of individual survey 
respondent? Second, what is the role of IR climate in analyzing the antecedents of union 
commitment? On the first of these questions, our aggregation analysis provided support for 
the treatment of IR climate as a workplace-level variable, with a relatively high level of 
inter-rater agreement within workplaces, significant between-workplace variance, and 
evidence that workplaces could be differentiated in terms of employee ratings of IR 
climate. These findings support the aggregation of employee ratings of IR climate to the 
workplace level, providing evidence that these are indeed measuring workplace “climate”, 
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rather than purely individual perceptions with variance solely at the inter-individual level 
(Schneider, White, and Paul 1998). Furthermore, on our second question, IR climate was 
negatively associated with union commitment, but only as a workplace-level variable.  
Individual-level “psychological” IR climate was not significantly associated with union 
commitment once workplace-level IR climate was included in the analysis.  
Our finding of a negative association between IR climate and union commitment is 
consistent with Deery, Iverson, and Erwin‟s (1994) individual-level Australian analysis, 
rather than with the North American studies that have found a positive relationship 
between IR climate and union commitment (Angle and Perry, 1986; Magenau, Martin, and 
Peterson 1988). In interpreting our finding, the negative association between IR climate 
and union commitment may reflect a tendency for members to feel less of a need for union 
protection where the workplace context is positive. Thus, where the IR climate is 
cooperative, members may be less likely to commit strongly to their union, an organization 
which has protection and grievance handling as its raison d’être. The earlier US studies 
have been taken to suggest that unions would be advised to “…change their adversarial 
images and to develop cooperation-oriented strategies” (Angle and Perry, 1986: 46). In 
contrast, Deery et al. conclude that “…the effects of any initiatives to improve the ambient 
labour-management climate may be more problematic than was initially implied in the US 
literature” (Deery, Iverson, and Erwin 1994: 593). Our UK results provide some additional 
support for the latter view in a non-US context, suggesting that unions do not necessarily 
gain from the development of a positive IR climate, at least in terms of winning member 
support. The inconsistency between the US findings on the one hand and those of Deery et 
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al and our study on the other suggests that further research is needed to evaluate this 
relationship, conducted in a variety of country and sector contexts.  
Of course, in interpreting our findings in this way, we have assumed that union 
commitment is predicted by job satisfaction, organizational commitment, union 
instrumentality, pro-union attitudes and IR climate. In doing so, we have adopted the 
conventional approach from the union commitment literature (e.g., Bamberger, Kluger, 
and Suchard 1999; Angle and Perry 1986; Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988; Deery, 
Iverson, and Erwin 1994). However, we cannot completely rule out reciprocal or reverse 
causation, with union commitment having an impact on workplace IR climate, for example 
if high levels of member commitment allow a union to be more assertive or militant. 
Further examination of this issue would require longitudinal research.  
We found no evidence that workplace-level IR climate significantly moderates any 
of the relationships between union commitment and its antecedents. Thus, the relationships 
between organizational commitment, job satisfaction, pro-union attitudes and union 
instrumentality appear to be similar across workplaces, regardless of the workplace IR 
climate. This provides no support for the IR climate moderation arguments advanced in the 
literature (Fuller and Hester 1998; Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988). These 
suggestions were based on arguments about “cognitive consistency” between 
organizational and union commitments in a cooperative IR climate, along with suggestions 
that instrumentality, and ideological and socialization influences may be more salient in an 
adversarial climate (Fuller and Hester 1998). Taken at face value, our findings suggest that 
such arguments are incorrect, and that unit IR climate has no moderating effects on these 
relationships. However, significant interactions can be difficult to find, and our sample is 
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relatively small in terms of the number of workplaces and individuals, suggesting that 
statistical power may be an issue (Hofmann, 1997). We therefore view our conclusions on 
the moderating effects of IR climate as tentative, and future research with larger samples 
would be justified.   
We also sought to replicate the earlier findings on the individual-level antecedents 
of union commitment, primarily to provide a baseline for our analysis of IR climate. Our 
findings suggested that instrumentality, pro-union attitudes and organizational commitment 
were positively associated with union commitment, as in Bamberger, Kluger, and 
Suchard‟s (1999) meta-analysis. However, job satisfaction was not significantly associated 
with union commitment, which differs from Bamberger, Kluger, and Suchard, who found a 
negative relationship. Nevertheless, our finding is consistent with some of the earlier 
studies (e.g., Fuller and Hester 1998; Tan and Aryee 2002).  
Our findings must be interpreted in light of the limitations of the study. First, we 
have already mentioned the relatively small sample size. Our confidence in the conclusion 
that workplace IR climate is negatively associated with individual-level union commitment, 
explaining variance over and above that accounted for by individual-level predictors, is not 
threatened by sample size. In fact, our relatively small sample provides a conservative test 
of this hypothesis (Vandenberghe, et al. 2007). As already mentioned, our finding of no 
significant cross-level effects is more problematic, and we emphasize that this conclusion 
must be treated with caution and awaits testing with a larger sample. Second, as we have 
seen, since the study was cross-sectional we cannot be definitive about causation, and 
further research of a longitudinal nature would be useful. Third, our findings may be 
susceptible to common method bias, since all our measures originated from the employee 
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survey. However, our measurement model provides evidence of discriminant validity for 
the individual-level constructs, and the significant workplace IR climate variable was a 
grouped measure, associated with individual-level union commitment, controlling for 
individual-level climate. It seems unlikely that the negative association between workplace 
IR climate and union commitment could be attributable largely to common method bias, 
not least because workplace-level climate rather than individual climate ratings was 
significantly associated with union commitment. Fourth, we operationalized union 
commitment as a unidimensional construct, reflecting an affective dimension. As 
explained earlier, this provided a parallel conceptualization to our organizational 
commitment scale. However, a limitation of such an approach is that we do not include the 
behavioral intent aspects of commitment, such as Gordon et al‟s (1980) “willingness to 
work for the union”. It would be useful to address this in future research by including 
behavioral commitment or union participation measures. Finally, our data came from one 
English region, the North East, an area traditionally characterized by a relatively pro-union 
culture. Whether our findings would replicate in regions with different historical and 
cultural legacies remains to be seen. Earlier mixed findings on the sign of the IR climate-
union commitment association (Deery, Iverson, and Erwin 1994; Angle and Perry 1986; 
Magenau, Martin, and Peterson 1988) leaves open the possibility for country, regional, 
sectoral and occupational variations here.  
We believe that this is the first time that IR climate has been formally assessed for 
its workplace-level characteristics, and that the antecedents of union commitment have 
been evaluated within a multi-level model. In spite of the limitations of the research, we 
have shown that it is appropriate to treat IR climate as a characteristic of the workplace 
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rather than purely as a perceptual variable, that the analysis of workplace climate is a 
fruitful area for research in industrial relations, and that such research might usefully 
incorporate a multi-level approach, analyzing the impact of climate and other workplace-
level factors on individual attitudes and behavior.  
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
24 
 
References 
Angle, Harold L and Perry, James L. 1986. “Dual Commitment and Labor-Management 
Relationship Climates”. Academy of Management Journal. 29, 1: 31-50. 
Bamberger, Peter A, Kluger, Avraham N., and Suchard, Ronena. 1999. “The Antecedents 
and Consequences of Union Commitment: a Meta-Analysis.” Academy of 
Management Journal 42(3):304-318. 
Bliese, P. D., and Halverson, R. R. 1998. “Group Size and Measures of Group-Level 
Properties: An Examination of Eta-Squared and ICC Values.” Journal of 
Management, 24: 157-172. 
Blyton, Paul, Dastmalchian, Ali, and Adamson, Raymond. 1987. “Developing the Concept 
of Industrial Relations Climate”, Journal of Industrial Relations, 29(2), 207-216. 
Chan, David. 1999. “Functional Relations Among Constructs in the Same Content Domain 
at Different Levels of Analysis: A Typology of Composition Models.” Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 83(2), 234-246. 
Clugston, Michael, Howell, Jon P., and Dorfman, Peter W. 2000. “Does Cultural 
Socialization Predict Multiple Bases and Foci of Commitment?” Journal of 
Management, 26(1): 5-30. 
Dastmalchian, Ali. 2008. “Industrial Relations Climate.” In The Sage Handbook of 
Industrial Relations, edited by Paul Blyton, Nicholas Bacon, Jack Fiorito, and 
Edmund Heery, pp. 548-571. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Dastmalchian, Ali, Blyton, Paul, and Adamson, Raymond. 1989. “Industrial Relations 
Climate: Testing a Construct.” Journal of Occupational Psychology, 62: 21-32. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
25 
 
Dastmalchian, Ali, Blyton, Paul, and Adamson, Raymond. 1991. The Climate of 
Workplace Relations, London, Routledge.  
Deery, Stephen, Erwin, Peter, and Iverson, Roderick. 1999. “Industrial Relations Climate, 
Attendance Behaviour and the Role of Trade Unions.” British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 37(4), December: 533-558. 
Deery, Stephen J., and Iverson, Roderick D. 2005. “Labor-Management Cooperation: 
Antecedents and Impact on Organizational Performance.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 58(4), July: 588-609. 
Deery, Stephen. J., Iverson, Roderick D., and Erwin, Peter J. 1994. “Predicting 
Organizational and Union Commitment: The Effect of Industrial Relations Climate. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32(4), December: 581-597. 
Fullagar, C., and Barling, J. 1989. “A Longitudinal Test of a Model of the Antecedents and 
Consequences of Union Loyalty”, Journal of Applied Psychology 74(2):213-227. 
Fullagar, Clive J., Gallagher, Daniel G., Clark, Paul F., and Carroll, Anthony E. 2004. 
“Union Commitment and Participation: A 10-year Longitudinal Study.” Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 89(4): 730-737.  
Fullagar, Clive J.A., McLean Parks, Judi, Clark, Paul F., and Gallagher, Daniel G. 1995. 
“Organizational Citizenship and Union Participation: Measuring Discretionary 
Membership Behaviors,” in Changing Employment Relations: Behavioral and 
Social Perspectives, ed by Lois E. Tetrick and Julian Barling, pp. 311-331. 
Washington: American Psychological Association. 
Fuller, J. Bryan, and Hester, Kim 1998. “The Effect of Labor Relations Climate on the 
Union Participation Process”, Journal of Labor Research, 19(1): 173-187. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
26 
 
Gavin, Mark B., and Hofmann, David A. 2002. “Using Hierarchical Linear Modeling to 
Investigate the Moderating Influence of Leadership Climate.” Leadership 
Quarterly, 13: 15-33. 
Hammer, Tove H., Currall, Steven C., and Stern, Robert N. 1991. “Worker Representation 
on Boards of Directors: A Study of Competing Roles.” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 44(4), July: 661-680. 
Herscovitch, Lynne, and Meyer, John P. 2002. “Commitment to Organizational Change: 
Extension of a Three-Component Model.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(3): 
474-487. 
Hofmann, David A. 1997. “An Overview of the Logic and Rationale of Hierarchical Linear 
Models.” Journal of Management, 23(6): 723-744. 
Hofmann, David A., Morgeson, Frederick P., and Gerras, Stephen J. 2003. “Climate as a 
Moderator of the Relationship Between Leader-Member Exchange and Content 
Specific Citizenship: Safety Climate as an Exemplar. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 88(1): 170-178. 
James, Lawrence R., Demaree, Robert G., and Wolf, Gerrit. 1984. “Estimating Within-
Group Interrater Reliability With and Without Response Bias.” Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 69(1): 85-98. 
James, Lawrence R., Demaree, Robert G., and Wolf, Gerrit. 1993. “rwg: An Assessment of 
Within-Group Interrater Agreement.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(2): 306-
309. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
27 
 
Kuenzi, Maribeth, and Schminke, Marshall. 2009. “Assembling Fragments Into a Lens: A 
Review, Critique and Proposed Research Agenda for the Organizational Work 
Climate Literature.” Journal of Management, 35(3): 634-717 
Liao, Hui, and Chuang, Aichia. 2004. “A Multilevel Investigation of Factors Influencing 
Employee Service Performance and Customer Outcomes.” Academy of 
Management Journal, 47(1): 41-58. 
Magenau, John M., Martin, James E., and Peterson, Melanie M. 1988. “Dual and 
Unilateral Commitment Among Stewards and Rank-and-file Members‟, Academy 
of Management Journal 31(2):359-376. 
Mellor, Steve 1990. “The Relationship Between Membership Decline and Union 
Commitment: A Field Study of Local Unions in Crisis.” Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 75(3): 258-267 
Meyer, John P., and Allen, Natalie  J. 1997. Commitment in the Workplace: Theory, 
Research and Application. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
Meyer, John P., Allen, Natalie  J., and Smith, Catherine A. 1993. “Commitment to 
Organizations and Occupations: Extension and Test of a Three-Component 
Conceptualization. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(4): 538-51. 
McShane, S. L. 1986. “General Union Attitude: A Construct Validation”, Journal of Labor 
Research  7(4):403-417.  
Naumann, Stefanie E., and Bennett, Nathan 2000. “A Case for Procedural Justice Climate: 
Development and Test of  a Multilevel Model.” Academy of Management Journal, 
43(5): 881-889.  
Office for National Statistics (2008) Regional Monthly Data. London. ONS. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
28 
 
Redman, Tom, and Snape, Ed 2005. “Unpacking Commitment: Multiple Loyalties and 
Employee Behaviour.” Journal of Management Studies, 42(2): 299-326. 
Reed, C. S., Young, W. R., and McHugh, P. P. 1994. “A Comparative Look at Dual 
Commitment: An International Study”, Human Relations  47(10):1269-93. 
Schneider, Benjamin, White, Susan S., and Paul, Michelle C. 1998. “Linking Service 
Climate and Customer Perceptions of Service Quality: Test of a Causal Model.” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(2): 150-163. 
Skarlicki, Daniel P., and Latham, Gary P. 1996. “Increasing Citizenship Behavior Within a 
Labor Union: A Test of Organizational Justice Theory.” Journal of Applied 
Psychology 81(2):161-169. 
Snape, Ed, and Redman, Tom. 2007. “The Nature and Consequences of Organization-
Employee and Union-Member Exchange: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of 
Labor Research, 28(2): 359-374. 
Spector, Paul E. 1997. Job Satisfaction: Application, Assessment, Causes and 
Consequences. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
Stagner, R and Efflal, B 1982. “Internal Union Dynamics During a Strike: A Quasi-
Experimental Study.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 67: 37-44 
Sverke, Magnus, and Sarosh Kuruvilla. 1995. “A New Conceptualization of Union 
Commitment: Development and Test of an Integrated Theory.” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior 16:519-533. 
Tan, H. H. and Aryee, S. 2002. “Antecedents and Outcomes of Union Loyalty: A 
Constructive Replication and an Extension”, Journal of Applied Psychology 
87(4):715-722. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
29 
 
Vandenberghe, Christian, Bentein, Kathleen, Michon, Richard, Chebat, Jean-Charles, 
Tremblay, Michel, and Fils, Jean-Francois. 2007. “An Examination of the Role of 
Perceived Support and Employee Commitment in Employee-Customer 
Encounters.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4): 1177-1187. 
Wagar, Terry H. 1997a. “The Labor-Management Relationship and Organizational 
Outcomes: Some Initial Findings.” Relations Industrielles, 52(2), Spring: 430-447. 
Wagar, Terry H. 1997b. “Is Labor-Management Climate Important? Some Canadian 
Evidence.” Journal of Labor Research, XVIII(1), Winter: 163-174. 
Wagar, Terry H., and Rondeau, Kent V. 2002. “Labour-Management Forums and 
Workplace Performance: Evidence from Union Officials in Health Care 
Organizations.” Journal of Management in Medicine, 16(6): 408-421. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
30 
 
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, correlations and reliabilities (individual-level variables). 
 
 
         Mean Std.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
            devn. 
 
 
1. Union commitment     3.53  1.45   .92 
2. Union instrumentality    4.27  0.98   .54*** .90 
3. Pro-union attitudes     5.11  1.12   .55*** .43*** .85 
4. Job satisfaction      4.79  1.47   .05  .15** .02  .84 
5. Organizational commitment   3.71  1.47   .20*** .26*** .12*  .59***  .84 
6. Psychological IR climate    3.57  1.35  -.03  .14*  .02  .51***  .46*** .89  
 
Note. Reliability coefficients are shown on the diagonal. 2-tailed tests. N=334.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 2 - Results of HLM analysis for the antecedents of union commitment 
 
 
Independent variable      Null model.  Model 2.  Model 3.  Model 4.   Model 5.    
 
 
Level 1 
Constant        3.54*** (0.13**)  3.53***  (0.11*)  3.53*** (0.10*)  4.65***  (0.08*)  4.61***  (0.09*)    
Organizational commitment         0.12*  (0.03)  0.15** (0.03)  0.16**  (0.02)  0.17**  (0.01)   
Job satisfaction           -0.05  (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.03  (0.02) -0.03  (0.02)  
Pro-union attitudes            0.50***  (0.02
†
)  0.49*** (0.01*)  0.49***  (0.01*)  0.69*  (0.02*)   
Union instrumentality           0.55***  (0.07
†
)  0.55*** (0.07*)  0.55*** (0.07*)  0.82
†
  (0.07*)   
Psychological IR climate             -0.13* (0.02) -0.07 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03) 
 
Level 2 
Workplace IR climate                  -0.31**   -0.30**  
Organizational commitment x IR climate                   --
 a   
  
Job satisfaction x IR climate                      --
 a
     
Pro-union attitudes x IR climate                   -0.06    
Union instrumentality x IR climate                   -0.08    
 
R
2
 for level-1 model           0.48     0.49     
R
2
 for level-2 intercept model                 0.13 
 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors. Estimates of the random error variance components in parentheses.  
N=334 for individual-level variables. N=31 for group-level variable (IR climate). 
a
 These parameters were not estimated, as explained in the text.  
† 
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
IR Climate and Union Commitment   
 
32 
 
Endnotes. 
                                                 
1
 Further details on the workplaces are included in an appendix, accessible at:  
www.dur.ac.uk/tom.redman/DataAppendix.doc. 
